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Abstract
The paper examines the impact of external pressure
in the act of onboarding trading partners to business-tobusiness (B2B) connectivity platforms. Articulating
different forms of external pressure (enticement and
enforcement) and drawing on a survey of 121
organizations, it examines the effect of three enticement
factors and three enforcement factors on firms’ decision
to adopt a B2B connectivity platform. In general,
enforcement measures (“sticks”) were found to be more
effective than enticement (“carrots”). Two exceptions
are presented: enticement works better than
enforcement in persuading organizations with high
invoicing intensity or heavy use of cloud technologies.
The authors discuss the overall finding and theorize in
light of the empirical study’s context, wherein the
platform generates asymmetric benefits to the trading
partners (i.e., an organization receiving the transaction
document delivered through the B2B connectivity
platform harnesses most of the benefits). The findings’
implications for research and practice are considered.

1. Introduction
Often, organizations invest in information system
(IS) development and implementation without knowing
whether they will be able to realize the benefits of the
associated investments [4, 8]. One prominent obstacle
of reaping the benefits is a failure to onboard relevant
stakeholders to use the implemented systems. Rejection
of the systems implemented are well-known roadblocks
recognized in the IS implementation literature, and
finding ways to overcome them remains a highly
relevant challenge for managers. Previous work has
considered the topic at both the level of individual
workers [1, 21, 25] and entire organizations [3, 11]. Our
work is focused on the organizational level.
The problem of non-use is accentuated in cases of
organizational technologies that enjoy considerable
network effects, as is the case with business-to-business
(B2B) connectivity platforms. Since the value derived
URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10125/71191
978-0-9981331-4-0
(CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)

Jukka Sihvonen
Aalto University School of Business,
Finland
jukka.sihvonen@aalto.fi

from using these technologies accrues in proportion
with the number of users, a member of the network has
reason to be active in persuading other organizations to
join in and making sure they do so. Examples of systems
in this category are telecommunication and messaging
networks, payment systems [28], open-standard
interorganizational information systems [41], and
electronic platforms in general [30]. As for examples of
failure, the Swedish government’s recent attempt to
implement an electronic business-reporting platform is
a prominent case of an IS implementation that failed to
deliver benefits and was ultimately discontinued [27].
The use of the platform, which enabled companies to
submit their annual reports by means of eXtensible
Business Reporting Language (XBRL), was not
obligatory for companies, and it remained sparsely
adopted. It was eventually abandoned because of its
insufficient user base. A contrasting example comes
from Denmark, where the use of a similar XBRL
platform was mandated. It received strong acceptance
from those required to use it and generated positive
outcomes [20].
Whereas organizations can mandate that their
employees use any system adopted [24], Imposing the
use of B2B connectivity platforms on trading partners is
far more complex [34]. The Danish example shows that
adoption by other organizations may be guaranteed
when the focal organization wields power rooted in
formal authority [20], which government organizations
often hold over private businesses. In B2B contexts,
however, the focal organization often has no such power
over the system’s end-user organizations. This lack of
authority calls for finding ways for the organization to
persuade its partner organizations to adopt the relevant
B2B connectivity platform.
In light of these issues, researchers have put
considerable effort into improving our understanding of
the diffusion factors associated with the deployment of
technologies that have important network effects, and
this work has led to the acknowledgment of external
pressure as a prerequisite to such information systems’
diffusion [26, 38]. However, instead of directly
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measuring the pressure experienced, prior studies have
gauged pressure via generic proxies such as estimation
of customers’ and suppliers’ technology adoption and
the perceived influence over the focal organization [38].
That approach does not consider the effects of concrete
pressuring actions, such as explicitly communicating a
demand that the business partner adopts the B2B
platform. In other words, the work thus far has focused
on the effect of the environment’s perceived pressure
potential instead of the pressure actually experienced.
Moreover, although the style of pressure is likely to
affect its outcomes in various contexts, little is known
of the effects of particular nuances and forms of external
pressure. These may range from mere enticement efforts
to strict enforcement and, ultimately, threats of
discontinuing the business relationship. Motivated by
the importance of attracting users to technological
platforms that draw on network effects and bringing
them aboard and by the apparent lack of studies probing
the nuances of persuasion, we asked, “Can the objective
of getting trading partners onto a B2B connectivity
platform be better achieved through enticement or
through enforcement?”

2. Literature on external pressure
Our objective was to study the effects of persuasion
on organizational decision-making in the context of
B2B connectivity platforms. To lay the groundwork for
discussing the study and our findings, we will review the
relevant literature (i) on the types of external pressure
imposed by other organizations, (ii) on B2B
connectivity platforms, and (iii) specifically addressing
external pressure’s role in persuading trading partners to
adopt B2B connectivity platforms.

2.1. Coercive forces – types of external
pressure exerted on organizations
Persuasion has traditionally been regarded as a
communication process in which a persuader sends a
persuasive message to a persuadee or group of
persuadees with the intention of changing that
audience’s attitudes or behavior [14]. Empirical
research on persuasion has most often focused on the
influence of persuasion on individuals’ attitudes,
presuming that these attitudes, in turn, will have an
effect on real-world behavior.
Within the organizational realm, institutional
theory notes that organizations face diverse institutional
pressures to conform to various rules and regulations in
their attempt to earn legitimacy of existence [36].
Collectively, these institutional pressures contribute to
interorganizational homogeneity [16], or institutional

isomorphism [7]. Prior literature outlines three main
processes through which this institutional isomorphism
among organizations comes about: coercive, mimetic,
and normative [7]. Mimetic isomorphism results from
organizations imitating their successful counterparts,
typically in response to uncertainty. Normative
isomorphism stems from the emergence of shared
values and practices within a profession. Finally,
coercive isomorphism, at the heart of our study, stems
from both formal and informal pressures exerted on
organizations. Sometimes, the coercive institutional
pressures are exerted on organizations by other
organizations, and these pressures may be felt by the
object of the pressure as force, as persuasion, or as
invitations to collusion [7].
Drawing on the institutional-theory literature’s
discussion of these manifestations, so as to distinguish
among the various forms of external pressure, we draw
a distinction between two main types of persuasion in
the context of organizational decision-making: gentle
enticement efforts (“enticement” from here on) and
coercive enforcement (“enforcement” from here on).
The former involves subtle nudging and informing the
organization’s decision-maker(s) about the benefits of
the technology with the aim of encouraging potential
users in that organization to adopt and deploy the system
in question. Thereby, enticement relies on the firm’s
natural willingness to deploy an information system that
it expects to provide it with certain specific utility.
Enforcement, on the other hand, can be seen as either a
form of persuasion [12] or an alternative to persuasion
[14]. It typically relies on a relatively dominant
organization applying bargaining power to its less
dominant business partners in the form of sanctions or
implications thereof [15]. This characterization points to
the importance of power as a vital antecedent to
enforcement behavior.
With persuasion being prevalent in all facets of
human life, it is studied extensively in most branches of
the social sciences, and discussion of its various
manifestations (e.g., enticement versus enforcement)
can be found in various streams of academic literature.
For instance, the concepts of enforcement and
enticement resonate with political and policy research’s
notions of negative–restraining and affirmative–
promoting governance tools [2]. The negative
(restraining) tools comprise penalties, or “sticks,” in the
form of punishment, costs, and negative sanctions
and/or threats of these, while the affirmative
(promoting) tools apply incentives, or “carrots,” through
rewards, benefits, grants, tax exemptions, and (promises
of) facilitative measures [2]. In research on cognition,
dual-process models of persuasion such as the
elaboration likelihood model (ELM) articulate two
broad avenues to persuasion: the main one, on which
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those receiving the persuasion messages carefully
process the arguments received, and a peripheral route,
on which receivers rely on mental shortcuts as a means
of reaching a conclusion [33]. One distinguishing factor
between the two routes is the degree of engagement with
the topic and the decision. As involvement rises,
reliance on the peripheral route and related heuristics
declines, and “close message processing” increases.

2.2. B2B connectivity platforms
A platform is “a business […] enabling valuecreating interactions between external producers and
consumers. The platform provides an open, participative
infrastructure for these interactions and sets governance
conditions for them” [31, p.5]. The set of B2B
connectivity platforms – labeled “transaction devices”
[10] – is a specific collection of platforms that provide
services that connect trading partners with regard to, for
example, supply-chain documents such as tenders,
orders, invoices, and payments. The recent surge of
interest in open networking and data standards, such as
XML (eXtensible Markup Language), has promoted the
growth of connectivity platforms in multiple industries
[31]. They can aid in companies’ work to conclude and
fulfill trading-related contracts, even when multiple
platform providers are involved. Examples of this type
of platforms include SAP Ariba, Tietoevry, and
Tradeshift.
B2B connectivity platforms enjoy considerable
network effects; i.e., the value of the network grows
sharply as the number of nodes in it increases.
Therefore, it is important for any focal firm to get its
trading partners to use the connectivity services offered
by the platform(s) it provides – i.e., to send and receive
trading documents on that platform. Bringing them
aboard in this sense has been termed “onboarding” in
the context of B2B connectivity platforms [32]. But how
to effectively trigger onboarding? Thus far, researchers
have devoted considerable effort to efforts to understand
the conditions promoting platform growth and
stimulating network effects. For instance, a firm may
employ a seeding strategy [30] or staged strategy [13] to
render the services immediately relevant for at least
those on one side of the relationship. With these users
attracted to the platform, their partners, on the other
side, will follow. Other strategies focus on subsidized
use and product giveaways [9, 29], which create
financial incentives for one party – again, with those on
the other side following in their turn. In contrast, a
marquee strategy focuses on key users on either side,
whose participation is deemed important enough to
make or break the platform’s growth [30]. External
pressure exerted by focal firms on their trading partners
represents is a crucial mechanism for platform growth,

especially in the realm of B2B connectivity platforms.
We address relevant literature on this matter next.

2.3. External pressure to adopt B2B
connectivity platforms
Li et al. [22] articulate three sets of factors with
potential to affect a firm’s decision to adopt and deploy
B2B connectivity platforms: decision-object factors
such as usefulness and complexity, decision-entity
factors such as resources and risk propensity, and
contextual factors such as trading partners’ convergent
influences and pressure from the external environment.
Focusing on contextual factors, a considerable body of
literature has addressed external environmental pressure
in the general context of interorganizational information
systems [6, 17, 35] and the specific one of electronic
invoicing [19, 31].
Interorganizational information system (IOS)
studies focus on coercive enforcement, wherein a more
powerful trading partner aims to dictate the IOS
deployment in the business relationship [6, 35].
Alternatively, some IOS studies address external
pressure in terms of competitive pressure, which
presumes competing market forces coercing the firm to
adopt the IOS [6, 17]. Studies of electronic invoicing
highlight recent developments favoring open standards
[41] and the resulting greater interoperability [31]. In
this context, several researchers have found benefit in
conducting configurational analysis [19, 23] suggesting
that the adoption of electronic invoicing is dependent on
the focal firm’s networks of trading partners.
The literature has not, however, taken into account
the nuances of persuasion. Persuasion has been
approached predominantly from the enforcement angle,
with limited regard for the fact that some persuasion
takes a non-coercive form – e.g., subtle enticement,
gentle nudging, or informing about the benefits of the
technology. This gap led us to attempt to provide a
richer view of persuasion, articulating its particular
forms with an eye to operationalizing them in the
context of electronic invoicing.

3. The empirical study
To address our research question and study the
impact of enticement and enforcement on organizational
information systems’ deployment, we sought to gather
empirical data in a setting where both types of pressure
would emerge naturally. Hence, we chose to examine
organizations’ deployment of electronic invoicing, a
technology that enjoys considerable network effects, in
that the benefits that “e-invoicing” brings to the firm
accrue in tandem with the number of its trading partners
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that end up using electronic invoicing. The latter factor
has led many organizations (both private and public) to
start pushing their trading partners toward electronic
invoicing platforms [32].
We chose to focus on two specific forms of
persuasion occurring between customers and suppliers:
enticement and enforcement. Since electronic invoicing
enables the party receiving the invoice (the customer) to
streamline and improve the process of handling
incoming invoices, greater benefits of e-invoicing
typically flow to the customer side [18]. Although
suppliers too can gain some benefits from moving over
to electronic invoicing and the associated adoption of
the relevant B2B connectivity platform (e.g., better
tracking afforded by digital invoices, automated
matching of the payments received against one’s sales
invoices, and improved workflow overall), these gains
are considerably smaller than those reaped by the
invoice recipient, which – via “straight-through invoice
processing” – can offload large amounts of work from
the laborious processes of purchase invoices’ reception,
processing, and payment. For example, with the threeway-matching principle,1 a buyer that receives an
electronic invoice may completely automate the
processing for that specific invoice. This asymmetric
benefit distribution leads to customers being more
enthusiastic about deploying electronic invoicing than
suppliers are about stepping aboard. This enthusiasm on
customers’ part has led them to adopt an industry
practice of putting pressure on their suppliers to adopt
electronic invoicing.2 Against this backdrop, we
examine the impact of the pressure they place on their
suppliers to implement e-invoicing such that the
suppliers will start sending invoices to them in
electronic format.

3.1. Collection of the data
We chose to gather data from suppliers, probing (i)
their ability to send electronic invoices and (ii) the
extent of enticement and enforcement they had
experienced from customers with regard to adopting
electronic invoicing for their sales-invoice processes.
The data were collected in collaboration with the
Federation of Finnish Entrepreneurs (FFE), which is the
largest entrepreneur and SME association in Finland,
1

Three-way-matching is the practice of matching the data content of
a purchase order, an invoice, and a delivery note. If the data of all three
documents (the amounts and product/service data) match, the invoice
can be processed automatically without any human intervention. This
is made possible by the purchase order already including all the
posting information necessary for processing the invoice and posting
it to bookkeeping systems. Among the global leaders employing the
three-way
matching
principle
are
Heineken
(e.g.,
https://www.basware.com/en-gb/blog/february-2019/heinekenautomates-invoice-processing-with-basware/) and UPM-Kymmene

representing 115,000 enterprises. We sampled 700 firms
at random from among its member enterprises, which
have between 10 and 250 employees (in line with the
European Union’s definition of an SME). There were
two main reasons for focusing on SMEs. First, we
sought to exclude the largest, publicly listed companies
from our sample. Presumably, their position and
economic influence on their trading partners would
render any pressuring efforts conceptually different
from those exerted on an SME. Second, we wished to
exclude the smallest firms from our sample since, with
some having only one or two trading partners, they
might not contribute to the richness of the empirical
setting. We composed an online survey which was
distributed via email to the sample of 700 SME
companies by FFE.

3.2. The data and methodology
Our dependent variable was the degree of electronic
invoicing in sales invoicing. For efficiency reasons, it is
common industry practice for firms to track the extent
of electronic invoicing with regard to both purchase and
sales invoices. Thus, we asked the respondents to
indicate the percentage of their firm’s customer
companies that receive invoices in electronic format.
For our main independent variables, we used three
Likert-scale items addressing enticement and three
items for enforcement. In the absence of preexisting
instruments to measure enticement and enforcement, we
developed items for the constructs by drawing on the
process presented by Chin et al. [5]. Firstly, we
developed a set of initial items for each construct. Then,
we critically evaluated each item and discussed whether
it is an appropriate reflection of the corresponding
construct. When the authors had achieved consensus, we
had four other IS scholars classify the mixed set of items
into two groups, after which we asked them to elaborate
on what was common to the items in each group. Their
responses were in line with our assessments: they found
some of the items to represent enforcement or coercion
while others were “softer” in nature and more
enticement-oriented. The first phase was followed by an
exploratory one for testing the instrument and, if so
required, refining it. Finally, confirmatory analysis was
conducted, resulting in the final constructs. For the
(http://epub.lib.aalto.fi/fi/ethesis/pdf/13186/hse_ethesis_13186.pdf).
The business case for three-way matching is considerable, since
invoices’ processing is a costly process: industry estimates put the cost
at, on average, 30 euros per invoice processed [18].
2
Illustrating the pressure applied, Finnish government agencies only
accept electronic invoices from their
suppliers, as indicated at https://www.valtiokonttori.fi/en/service/gov
ernment-electronic-invoicing-website/#invoicing-finnishgovernment-agencies.
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control variables, we used various items related to
company size, the systems in use, industry, invoicing
volume, and e-invoicing intention. Table 1 summarizes
the final constructs and the control variables employed
in the empirical study.
Table 1. The variable constructs
Construct (variable)
Degree of electronic
invoicing in sales
invoicing
(e_invoicing)
Enforcement1
(stick1)

Question
The percentage of customer companies
that receive invoices in electronic format

Enforcement2
(stick2)

Our customers have pressured us to
implement electronic invoicing (e.g., by
threatening to impose additional fees for
paper invoices).
Our customers have coerced us to
implement electronic invoicing.
Our customers have informed us about
the financial and environmental benefits
of electronic invoicing.
Our customers have offered enticement
for implementing electronic invoicing.
Our customers have encouraged us to
implement electronic invoicing.
How many employees does your
company employ?
What was the last reported annual
turnover of your company?
How many sales invoices do you send
per year (incl. all customers)?
(approximate)
How many customers do you send sales
invoices to? (approximate)
Does your company use a cloud-based
accounting system?
Are you currently increasing the number
of e-invoices in your sales invoicing?
Are you planning to increase the number
of e-invoices in your sales invoicing in
the near future?

Enforcement3
(stick3)
Enticement1
(carrot1)
Enticement2
(carrot2)
Enticement3
(carrot3)
Company size
(employees)
Company turnover
(turnover)
Customer base
(customers)
Invoicing volume
(invoices)
Cloud system
(cloudsys)
E-invoicing intentions
(e_intents)

Our customers have demanded that we
implement electronic invoicing.

After screening for complete responses, we were
left with 121 observations to use in our empirical
analysis. Table 2 presents summary statistics associated
with the degree of e-invoicing. The mean and median
degrees reported are, respectively, 63% and 71%, with
a standard deviation of 29 percentage points. The
coefficient of variation (0.46) implies considerable
differences in the respondent-reported degrees of einvoicing in sales invoicing.
Table 2. Non-transformed variables
Mean
e_invoicing
stick1

Min.

Max.

62.76

Median Std. dev.
71.00

29.11

0.00

100.00

3.16

3.00

1.35

1.00

5.00

stick2
stick3

2.01
1.84

1.00
1.00

1.20
1.09

1.00
1.00

5.00
5.00

carrot1
carrot2

2.96
2.89

3.00
3.00

1.30
1.25

1.00
1.00

5.00
5.00

3.12
3.00
1.27
35.59
13.00
97.09
2690083 1000001 6827864

1.00
8.00
1

5.00
625.00
50000001

2
20
0.00
0.00
53.00

10000
150000
1.00
1.00
6264.00

carrot3
employees
turnover
customers
invoices
cloudsys
e_intents
pweight

292
2988
0.50
0.71
685.57

100
800
1.00
1.00
425.84

1022
13955
0.50
0.46
625.73

4. Analysis and findings
For our main analysis, we applied linear multiple
regression models to identify the importance of each
independent variable in a joint statistical setting. For the
linear estimators to be well specified, some variables
were transformed so as to be consistent with the
underlying statistical assumptions. Firstly, the volumebased control variables, having highly skewed
distributions, were log-transformed and winsorized at
the one-percent level. Secondly, the independent
variables were coded into first-order orthogonal
polynomials, which maintain the ordinal relationship of
the Likert scale and provide for orthogonal contrast with
the lower- and higher-order terms. Thirdly, new control
variables, productivity and intensity, replaced the
original and mildly multicollinear variables turnover
and invoices, respectively, without a loss of
information. The variable productivity is the central
difference between company turnover and the number
of employees. In that it, in effect, measures the weighted
turnover-per-employee ratio and is orthogonal to
employees. Along similar lines, intensity is the
orthogonal difference between invoicing volume
(invoices) and the number of customers (customers).
The described orthogonalization procedures reduce
Variance Inflation Factors of the multiple regression
models to very close to 1.
Our initial descriptive analysis of both persuasion
constructs (enforcement and enticement) revealed
differences among the three items. This prompted us to
inspect the wording of the various items, and we
confirmed that the first item in both constructs was
indeed relatively mild and the third was more severe (for
example, with the enforcement construct’s items
corresponding to the following in English, in ascending
severity: “demanded [that the respondent] implement,”
“pressured [the respondent] to implement,” and
“coerced [the respondent] to implement”). Therefore,
for each type of persuasion, we will refer to the items in
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terms of the distinct level represented (the first item, the
mildest, being referred to also as “low”; the second as
“medium”; and the final, severe one as “high”).
We estimated the multiple-regression models by
using a generalized linear model (GLM) framework
with a logit link function. In the estimation, each
observation is weighted by its survey sampling
probability, to permit population-level inferences.3 The
goodness-of-fit of each model was assessed by means of
three statistics: R2, the predictive power of the model as
the square of the correlation between the observed and
the predicted values [40]; F-statistic, for an overall Ftest of the regression slopes; and the root mean square
error, or RMSE, of the predicted response relative to that
observed.
We considered four distinct model specifications.
The reduced model tests for the direct effects of the
independent variables, without including the control
variables. Secondly, the baseline model includes both
the independent and control variables. The industry
model, in turn, is identical to the baseline model in terms
of the coefficient magnitudes but has the coefficient
standard errors clustered by industry instead of for the
individual. Finally, the pca model replaces the six
independent variables with four principal components.
In an additional step, we applied varimax rotation to
convert the principal loadings into a simpler, more
interpretable structure. Accordingly, the variables for
moderate and high enforcement (stick2 and stick3) are
replaced by their average (stick23) in the pca model,
and, correspondingly, the variables for moderate and
high enticement (carrot2 and carrot3) are replaced with
carrot23. The variables for low levels of enforcement
and enticement, stick1 and carrot1, remain unchanged.
The four rotated components explain 94% of the total
variance in the six independent variables, indicating that
the rotation results in only a marginal loss of
explanatory power in the context of the pca model.
Table 3 presents the results for various multipleregression specifications. Overall, the explanatory
power of the full-scale models is reasonably high, with
the R2 value rising above 22% and the F-statistics for all
the models showing statistical significance at the
one-percent level. The estimated parameters for the
independent variables are stable and sign-consistent
across all the models. The coefficients for the control
variables are also sign-consistent, and, as a whole, they
explain an additional 13.8 percentage points of the

variation (reduced R2 vs. baseline R2), which supports
our choices for the control variables. Importantly, the
inclusion of the control variables does not render the
independent variables statistically insignificant. This
implies that the control variables and independent
variables explain separate sources of variation.

3

median probability weight in our sample is 425, indicating that the
median observation in it represents 425 companies of similar size in
the population. We use survey estimation procedures in Stata’s svy
module. Data on Finnish companies were obtained from Statistics
Finland:
https://www.tilastokeskus.fi/tup/suoluk/suoluk_yritykset_en.html.

Probability weights are used to weight the sample back to the
population from which it was drawn. The 121 companies represented
in the sample were split into eight size buckets, with upper bounds of
4, 9, 19, 49, 99, 249, 499, and 999 employees. The probability
weight for each observation is calculated as Ni /ni, where i indexes
the size bucket of company i, Ni is the number of companies in the
population, and ni is the number of companies in the sample. The

Table 3. Multiple-regression analysis
Model
Variable
stick1
stick2
stick3
carrot1
carrot2
carrot3

reduced

baseline

industry

pca

1.099***
(3.21)
-0.115
(-0.26)
-0.536
(-1.20)
0.642**
(2.00)
-0.395
(-0.69)
-0.334
(-0.54)

1.079***
(3.08)
-0.358
(-1.01)
-0.309
(-0.76)
0.589*
(1.80)
-0.118
(-0.19)
-0.464
(-0.69)

1.079*
(2.33)
-0.358
(-0.64)
-0.309
(-0.45)
0.589*
(2.10)
-0.118
(-0.25)
-0.464
(-1.47)

1.065***
(3.41)

stick23
carrot23
employees
productivity
customers
intensity
cloudsys
e_intents
R2
RMSE
F-statistic

0.0920
0.285
3.165

0.475***
(3.69)
0.211*
(1.65)
-0.196***
(-2.85)
0.120
(0.89)
0.594***
(2.69)
-0.120
(-0.40)
0.228
0.270
4.205

0.475**
(2.59)
0.211*
(1.96)
-0.196
(-1.80)
0.120
(1.18)
0.594**
(3.30)
-0.120
(-0.29)
0.228
0.270
4.205

0.591*
(1.82)

-0.333*
(1.77)
-0.300
(-1.53)
0.475***
(3.70)
0.213*
(1.67)
-0.196***
(-2.84)
0.120
(0.88)
0.580***
(2.76)
-0.084
(-0.33)
0.224
0.268
4.940

The coefficients of the independent variables show
a clear pattern across effort levels. Overall, the
estimated impacts of the variables for mild persuasion
efforts, stick1 and carrot1, are positive and of large
magnitude. In contrast, the variables for moderate and
still greater efforts, identified by the suffixes “2” and
“3”, are negative but generally insignificant. The sole
exception in this regard appears to be the pca model, in
which the combined variable for moderate to high
enforcement (stick23) is borderline statistically
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significant (-0.467, t=-1.77). In comparison of the two
low-intensity persuasion efforts, the variable for light
enforcement, stick1 (1.065 to 1.099, t>=2.33), seems to
have a larger impact than the one for light enticement,
carrot1 (0.589 to 0.642, t>=1.80).
Four of the control variables are generally
significant across all model specifications, while two are
consistently insignificant. Company size (0.475),
measured as the natural logarithm of the number of
employees, and the use of cloud-based accounting
systems (0.580 to 0.594) exhibit a robust positive
association with the dependent variable. Company
productivity, measured as the natural logarithm of
turnover per employee, too shows a positive correlation
with the dependent variable, albeit less robustly (0.211
to 0.213). The number of customers is negatively
associated with e-invoicing (-0.197 to -0.196).
Next, we re-estimated the pca model separately for
each characteristic-based subgroup to gain further
insight into the mediating roles of respondent characteristics. Also, this allowed us to test whether our findings
for the overall sample hold across various respondent
subgroups. Under this approach, we chose a set of
control variables with potential to display a mediating
role and split the full sample into two subgroups, low
and high, corresponding to the sample median of each
control variable. Under the null hypothesis, the
estimated regression parameters for the low and high
samples are pairwise identical and reveal no further
insights vis-à-vis the full-sample model. Under the
alternative hypothesis, one or more parameters exhibit a
regression discontinuity across the median split,
uncovering new perspectives on the dependent
variable’s precise relationship with enforcement and
enticement.
Table 4 presents the results for the split-sample
analysis based on company size (turnover), customer
base (customer), invoicing intensity (intensity), and use
of cloud-based accounting systems (cloudsys). Control
variables are included in regressions but omitted from
the table for brevity.
Table 4. Median split results
Variable
stick1
stick23
carrot1
carrot23
R2
RMSE
F-statistic

low
0.630
(0.82)
0.166
(0.27)
0.219
(0.33)
-0.418
(-0.58)
0.203
0.507
1.398

turnover
high
1.324***
(4.33)
-0.679**
(-2.27)
0.723*
(1.94)
-0.477
(-1.63)
0.186
0.354
6.289

customer
low
high
0.901*
0.933**
(1.81)
(2.13)
-0.273
-0.800**
(-0.55)
(-2.17)
0.884**
0.183
(2.42)
(0.20)
-0.596
0.211
(-1.50)
(0.46)
0.225
0.0685
0.359
0.560
3.158
2.527

stick1
stick23
carrot1
carrot23
R2
RMSE
F-statistic

intensity
low
high
1.484***
0.423
(3.39)
(1.06)
-0.867***
0.612
(-3.33)
(1.04)
0.325
1.156*
(0.81)
(1.89)
-0.328
-0.805*
(-0.76)
(-1.73)
0.203
0.121
0.425
0.426
3.825
2.728

cloudsys
no
yes
1.494***
0.157
(3.60)
(0.26)
-0.336
-0.288
(-0.88)
(-0.64)
0.401
0.916*
(0.91)
(1.78)
-0.557
-0.023
(-1.41)
(-0.06)
0.187
0.119
0.424
0.433
3.325
1.974

In the subsample estimations, low levels of
enforcement generally have a larger impact than mild
enticement, with two notable exceptions. The first of
these involves firms with high invoicing intensity (the
number of invoices divided by the number of
customers); the low- and high-strength enticement
variables (carrot1 and carrot23) are both larger in
magnitude than their enforcement counterparts (stick1
and stick23). The exact opposite holds in the lowintensity model, where the enforcement coefficients are
larger and statistically significant. The second exception
is seen with the cloudsys median split, where the
variable for mild enticement has a larger estimated
impact than does the mild-enforcement variable for the
high sample while the results are vice versa for the low
sample.
The models for low- and high-turnover companies
are presented in the first two columns of numbers in
Table 4. The F-statistic shows that the high model is
statistically dominant, indicating that it is mainly highturnover companies that drive the parameter estimates
in the pca model. The model for smaller companies,
low, is not statistically significant as a whole, although
the estimated impacts of intensity (-0.298, t=1.74) and
cloudsys (-0.979, t=1.66) are twice as large as they are
in the high-turnover model. As for the independent
variables, the high-turnover model predicts similar but
stronger positive effects on mild-level efforts than the
pca model does, along with strong negative effects on
strong enforcement efforts. The R2 measurements imply
that the two models explain the same amount of
variation in the low and high sample, in relative terms,
although there seems to be much more variation in the
low sample (RMSE=0.507).
The customer median split analysis suggests that
both low-effort variables (stick1 and carrot1) are
positively associated with the dependent variables in the
low customer model, while only stick1 and stick2 are
significantly impactful in the larger-customer-base
sample (high).
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5. Discussion
We set out to explore the influence of external
pressure in the act of onboarding trading partners to B2B
connectivity platforms. While previous research has
examined the impact of perceived institutional pressure
on IOS adoption [38], it has not delved deeply into the
effects of more concrete pressuring experiences.
Moreover, specific nuances of pressure ranging from
soft/light persuasion to strong coercion have not been
distinguished, even though scholars have expressed
interest in understanding particular types of persuasive
messages in the context of multi-sided platforms, since
such communications are expected to help draw users to
the platforms [37]. In response to these gaps, we
investigated the effect of enticement and enforcement in
getting a focal firm’s suppliers to adopt a given
connectivity platform for submission of the suppliers’
transaction documents (invoices) in the desired
standardized electronic form. Overall, our findings
suggest that enforcement has greater influence than
enticement: sticks work better than carrots. This finding
has several implications for theory and management
practice, as discussed below.

5.1. Implications for theory
It was not entirely unexpected that we found
enforcement to work better than enticement in
customers’ endeavors to get their trading partners (i.e.,
suppliers) to submit invoices in electronic format. We
argue that two inherent characteristics of e-invoicing are
behind this. Firstly, e-invoicing is not the core function
of most firms; rather, it is a support function, a back-end
process. Firms’ top executives and decision-makers
typically have a relatively short attention span when
tackling concerns related to such back-end processes
that tend to escape their radar [31]. We link this finding
to the two routes identified in the ELM approach [33]:
the main (“central”) route, on which receivers carefully
process message arguments, and the peripheral one,
which involves relying on mental shortcuts for coming
to a conclusion. From our findings, it seems that
triggering the central route for a supplier requires the
stakeholder to employ enforcement. Secondly, the gains
from e-invoicing are asymmetric in that most of the
benefits are enjoyed by the party receiving the invoice:
moving to e-invoicing lets the buyer streamline and
automate its invoice-processing practices and achieve
significant cost savings. A corresponding connection
between asymmetric division in the benefits brought by
digitalization and a need for enforcement has been
identified in other, similar contexts such as XBRLbased government reporting.

Our fine-grained analysis of the data reveals two
exceptions to this overriding effect of enforcement as
opposed to enticement. Enticement was found to be
more effective than enforcement when exerted on highinvoicing-intensity organizations and heavy users of
cloud computing. Regarding the first category, we argue
that organizations with high invoicing intensity tend to
have closer business relationships with their customers,
resulting from relatively extensive interaction with the
customers (at least in terms of business-transaction
documents). We theorize that in such relationships,
enticement seems to function better than enforcement
does for persuading one’s business partners to sign up
for the relevant B2B connectivity platform. Secondly,
considering the use of cloud-based technologies, one
can interpret the use of such solutions as a proxy for an
organization’s level of technology-readiness. For cloudapplication-intensive firms, enticement might be a
sufficient trigger for adopting e-invoicing, so blunt
enforcement instruments may not be needed.
Notwithstanding all these interpretations, our findings
point toward the contingent nature of IOS adoption:
there exists no universal or single best approach.

5.2. Management implications
If wishing to harness the benefits of network
technologies, managers must find salient ways to
maximize the number of nodes in their networks.
Academic and practitioner literature already provide a
plethora of insights with regard to mechanisms that
could be used for this purpose, as discussed in our
review of literature on platform-growth strategies. Our
study was focused on one specific tool in this toolkit:
external pressure in the form of enticement and
enforcement. Interestingly, we found that, for both
enticement and enforcement, lower levels of external
pressure seemed to work better than stronger methods
did. Thus, gentle enticement and gentle enforcement are
more effective in bringing trading partners aboard B2B
connectivity platforms. Our findings thus reveal that,
when exerting pressure, managers need to be aggressive
but not too aggressive; that is, while they must enforce
the use of technologies, some limits to the enforcement
are sensible. Accordingly, managerial mindfulness and
sensitivity to context are called for in the design and
application of pressuring methods.
When making management recommendations in
light of our study’s results, one must be mindful of our
empirical context, with its asymmetry of benefits
between the sender and the receiver of invoices. We
encourage managers to address this by analyzing the
potential lopsidedness of benefits between the two sides
of the platform and devising their platform strategies
accordingly. Enforcement is one option that managers
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should consider – context and the rules of the game
permitting – when there exist critical user parties whose
gains from starting to use the platform are significantly
smaller than the other side’s.

5.3. Limitations and further research
Like all studies, ours has its limitations. Firstly, we
chose to focus on a technology that enjoys considerable
network effects: B2B connectivity platforms and, more
specifically, e-invoicing. The conclusions from the
study and its implications are heavily influenced by this
specific empirical context characterized by power
imbalances and asymmetric rewards. For greater
generalizability and a broader picture, further studies
could cover a wider selection of technologies with larger
sample sizes and perhaps note the varying effects of
enticement and enforcement across different classes of
technologies. Secondly, our empirical evidence came
from Finland, in the region of the world with the highest
degree of e-invoicing. While this choice allowed us to
study e-invoicing in a naturally rich empirical setting,
further research could look into the subject in
geographical settings where e-invoicing is less
common. Thirdly, while we focused on trading-partnerwielded enticement and enforcement, we acknowledge
that external pressure can be exerted on firms from
various other quarters – as represented by government
regulation, third-sector actors such as non-governmental
organizations, etc. Further research could study the
impact that these players may have on individual firms
considering subscribing to a particular B2B connectivity
platform. Also, the somewhat coarse division of external
pressure into enticement and enforcement needs further
research by probing the nuances of the two main types
and their influence upon different IT governance modes
[39]. Finally, the cross-sectional nature of our study
imposes limits on the conclusions that may safely be
drawn from its results. While a link between pressure
and degree of e-invoicing may be theoretically justified,
we cannot make definitive claims as to the direction of
causality between the two. For instance, it is possible
that another, unknown variable could explain both the
pressure experienced and degree of e-invoicing within
our sample, rendering the two variables of interest
correlated but not causally related. That said, we find
that a link between the two is the most plausible
explanation for the variation observed. We nevertheless
encourage researchers to pursue longitudinal and
experimental approaches that allow a full causal
examination of pressuring’s effects.
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